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The Real Problem with Carried Interests
Heather M. Field
The recent proposals to reform the tax treatment of private equity, venture capital, and
hedge fund managers are misguided. Policymakers and commentators often take
industry-focused, results-oriented approaches to the “carried interest” debate, thereby
obscuring the real source of the policy objection to carried interests. Instead of starting
with a result that is objectionable and trying to find a way to change the law to avoid the
objectionable result, this Article begins with the law and facts relevant to carried interests
and systematically unpacks the tax rules that combine to produce the current tax
treatment of carried interests. As a consequence, this Article provides structure to the
voluminous discourse about carried interests, identifies the key features of the tax law that
are most likely to cause hostility toward carried interests, and analyzes how to design
reform proposals that are most responsive to each objection. More generally, this Article
redirects attention away from the narrow carried interest issue and toward the more
fundamental aspects of the tax system that need reform.
Ultimately, the appropriate response to the carried interest controversy (assuming a
response is warranted) depends on whether the crux of the problem is the use of equity
compensation, one or more technical aspects of the partnership tax rules, revenue needs,
distributive justice considerations, disapproval of the fund industry, or something else
entirely. But the recent legislative proposals fail to respond effectively to any of these
issues, and should be therefore abandoned. Instead, policymakers should uncover and fix
their fundamental problem with carried interests.

 Associate Academic Dean & Bion Gregory Chair in Business Law, University of California
Hastings College of the Law. I appreciated the opportunity to present this paper at the Fall 2012
Northern California Tax Professor Roundtable, and I thank all of the event participants, particularly
Sarah Lawsky, for their helpful feedback. I also want to thank Susie Morse for her valuable input on
this project and Bill Dodge for encouraging me to write this Article.
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The Cut Unjustified Loopholes Act, introduced by Senator Carl
Levin on February 11, 2013, is one of the latest legislative attempts to
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reform the tax treatment of private equity, venture capital, and hedge
fund managers who receive interests in fund profits (“carried interests”)
1
as compensation. Senator Levin joins President Obama and many other
2
policymakers and commentators in calling for carried interest reform.
But these recent reform proposals are misguided. This is not because
the current tax treatment of fund managers is necessarily appropriate.
Rather, this is because recent commentators and policymakers have failed
to systematically unpack the features of the tax law that combine to
produce the current tax treatment of fund managers’ carried interests. This
failure obscures the real source of the policy objection to the taxation of
carried interests.
The recent discourse generally reflects an industry-oriented approach
that focuses on the tax treatment of compensatory partnership interests
primarily in the private equity fund, venture capital fund, and hedge fund
3
industries. This contrasts starkly with older literature on compensatory

1. Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act, S. 268, 113th Cong. (2013). Senator Levin reintroduced
the carried interest legislation on February 11, 2013. See Senator Carl Levin, Levin Floor Statement on
Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.levin.senate.gov/newsroom/
speeches/speech/levin-floor-statement-on-cut-unjustified-tax-loopholes-act. Similar proposals have
been introduced over the past several years, but none has been enacted. See, e.g., Carried Interest
Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 4016, 112th Cong. §§ 2−3; Job Creation and Tax Cuts Act of 2010, S. 3793,
111th Cong. § 401; H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
2. In the Fiscal Year 2014 Budget Proposal, President Obama renewed his call for carried
interest reform. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2014 Budget of the U.S. Gov’t 18
(2013) [hereinafter Fiscal Year 2014 Budget]; Reforming the Tax Code, the White House,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/economy/reform/tax-reform (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (President Obama
calling for Congress to “close the carried interest loophole for investment fund managers”); see also
infra notes 8−9, 39 (citing a wide variety of recent calls for carried interest reform).
3. See generally Tax Treatment of Compensation Paid to Hedge, Private Equity and Venture
Capital Fund Managers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Darryll K. Jones, Professor of Law, Stetson University School of Law) [hereinafter Jones Statement]
(focusing on the fund industry); Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th Cong., Present Law and
Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part
I (same); Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2008) (focusing on the taxation of service partners in the fund industry); Lynn
Forester de Rothschild, A Costly and Unjust Perk for Financiers, Op-Ed., N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2013, at
A17 (focusing on “an already privileged sliver of financiers”); see, e.g., Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All
Carried Interests Are Created Equal, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 713, 723−24, 734 (2009) (explaining the
general framing of the debate, not as a controversy over the “technical application” of the partnership
rules, but rather as a question about whether managers of private equity funds should be able to be
compensated with income that is taxed at preferential rates). But see generally How to Tax Carried
Interests: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark P. Gergen,
Fondren Chair for Faculty Excellence, Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law) (recommending that the carried
interest reform apply to all partnerships); Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests,
74 Brook. L. Rev. 1283 (2009) (considering the tax treatment, generally, of partners who receive
interests in partnership profits). Cf. Philip F. Postlewaite, Fifteen and Thirty-Five—Class Warfare in
Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code: The Taxation of Human Capital upon the Receipt of a
Proprietary Interest in a Business Enterprise, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 817, 890 (2009) (criticizing the “myopic
focus upon a single industry”); Alan D. Viard, The Taxation of Carried Interest: Understanding the
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partnership interests, which generally analyzed compensatory partnership
4
interests more broadly regardless of industry. But that older literature
predates both the key revenue procedures regarding compensatory
5
partnership interests and the enormous growth of the fund industry that
6
occurred over the past two decades. Thus, today’s debate is framed by
the newer literature that generally adopts a narrow fund-focused
approach.
Moreover, many recent political and popular commentators, and
even some academic commentators, adopt a results-oriented approach.
They often begin from the premise that carried interests should be taxed
7
as ordinary income to a greater degree than under current law, and they
8
seek to design reforms that would achieve this goal.
Issues, 61 Nat’l Tax J. 445, 458 (2008) (“At a more fundamental level, it is not clear why partners
providing investment services, however defined, should be treated differently from partners providing
other forms of labor to partnerships.”).
4. See generally Sheldon I. Banoff, Conversions of Services Into Property Interests: Choice of
Form of Business, 61 Taxes 844 (1983); Martin B. Cowan, Receipt of an Interest in Partnership Profits
in Consideration for Services: The Diamond Case, 27 Tax L. Rev. 161 (1972); Laura E. Cunningham,
Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 Tax L. Rev. 247 (1992); Mark P. Gergen,
Pooling or Exchange: The Taxation of Joint Ventures Between Labor and Capital, 44 Tax L. Rev. 519
(1989) [hereinafter Gergen, Pooling or Exchange]; Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K:
Compensating Service Partners, 48 Tax L. Rev. 69 (1993) [hereinafter Gergen, Service Partners];
Barksdale Hortenstine & Thomas W. Ford, Jr., Receipt of a Partnership Interest for Services: A
Controversy That Will Not Die, 65 Taxes 880 (1987); Leo L. Schmolka, Taxing Partnership Interests
Exchanged for Services: Let Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 Tax L. Rev. 287 (1992). It is not,
however, enough merely to refer back to the older literature, as that literature does not sufficiently
address the carried interest issue. This is because those commentators generally wrote prior to the
1993 and 2001 revenue rulings regarding compensatory partnership interests, and prior to the
enormous growth of the fund industry that occurred over the past two decades. Moreover, the older
articles predate the industry focused discourse, so they could not argue against that narrow focus.
5. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343; Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191.
6. Assets under management by hedge funds and private equity funds recently hit new record
highs at $2.25 trillion and $3 trillion, respectively. Hedge Fund Assets Under Management Reach New
Record, MFA Blog (Jan. 18, 2013) https://www.managedfunds.org/2013/01/hedge-fund-assets-undermanagement-reach-new-record; Press Release, Preqin, Private Equity Assets Hit $3tn: Growth of
Industry
Continues
as
Performance
Figures
Show
Recovery
(July 30,
2012),
www.preqin.com/docs/press/2012_Performance_Monitor.pdf. The older literature also predates the
high-profile press about the excesses of fund managers who exemplify increasing income inequality.
See, e.g., James B. Stewart, The Birthday Party, New Yorker, Feb. 11, 2008, at 100 (explaining how
Stephen Schwarzman’s lavish birthday party shortly following Blackstone’s IPO made Schwarzman
“private equity’s designated villain”).
7. See, e.g., Darryll K. Jones, Sophistry, Situational Ethics, and the Taxation of the Carried
Interest, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 675, 675 (2009) (providing a “strident expression of indignation” and
calling it “a patently offensive outcome” that “sometimes extraordinarily well-paid fund managers
receive compensation taxed at capital gains rates” whereas all “other, usually very much lowercompensated, service providers are taxed at ordinary rates”); Alan S. Blinder, The Under-Taxed Kings
of Private Equity, N.Y. Times, July 29, 2007, at 4(L) (calling it “hard to swallow” that “[s]ome people
who are richer than Croesus are paying 15 cents in federal income taxes on the marginal dollar, while
you may be paying 25 or 35 cents”); Warren E. Buffett, Op-Ed, A Minimum Tax for the Wealthy, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26, 2012, at A27 (“We need to get rid of arrangements like ‘carried interest’ that enable
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Given the current industry-focused and results-oriented discourse,
proposals to reform the taxation of carried interests are often ad hoc
rather than measures that would be intellectually coherent within our
existing tax regime and that would address the fundamental problem(s)
behind carried interests. As a result, the recent legislative proposals
regarding carried interests would make the tax code more complex,
increase transaction costs, and further distort taxpayer incentives as to the
structure of compensation for service partners. Even more problematic is
that all of the attention on carried interest reform proposals diverts
policymakers’ time and energy away from the critical issues of
fundamental tax reform and toward this narrow (but politically salient)
issue that is merely a symptom of underlying problems that plague the
tax system.
So rather than starting with a result that is objectionable and trying
to find a way to change the law to avoid the objectionable result, this
Article begins with the law and facts relevant to carried interests and
systematically unpacks the tax rules that combine to produce the current
tax treatment of carried interests. The benefits of this approach are
threefold.
First, this Article provides much-needed structure to the voluminous
discourse about carried interests. Second, by parsing the tax treatment of
carried interests and identifying the features of the tax law that are most
likely to be the sources of hostility toward carried interests, this Article
helps policymakers devise reforms that are responsive to the root of that
hostility. Of course, different readers may have different normative
objections to carried interests. But our inability to agree about reform
could be explained by these differences. Unless each of us understands
what really troubles us about carried interests, it is difficult to have a

income from labor to be magically converted into capital gains.”); Romney Supports Retaining Tax
Loophole That Keeps His Tax Rate Lower than Middle-Class Americans’, Organizing for Action
(Feb. 24,
2012),
http://www.barackobama.com/truth-team/entry/romney-supports-retaining-taxloophole-that-keeps-his-tax-rate-lower-than-m (reporting that during the 2012 election campaign,
President Obama criticized Mitt Romney for supporting an “unjustified” and “unfair tax loophole for
the wealthy”).
8. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 4759 (explaining a variety of reform alternatives to tax all
or part of the carried interests as ordinary income); Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Levin
Statement on Need to Close Carried Interest Loophole (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/press/release/levin-statement-on-need-to-close-carried-interest-loophole (“Of all the tax
loopholes that have tilted the tax code toward wealthy individuals, the carried interest loophole is one
of the most egregious. It allows hedge fund managers and certain others to pay a special tax rate far
lower than what they should owe on their income, lower than the rate millions of American families
pay.”). A minority of commentators argue that the current manner of taxing carried interests should
not be changed. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, In Defense of the Current Treatment of
Carried Interest, 139 Tax Notes 1203, 1203 (June 3, 2013); David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of
Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 715, 719 (2008).
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candid and productive conversation about how to proceed conceptually
9
or concretely. However, whatever one’s fundamental problem with
carried interests, the recent legislative proposals to change the tax
treatment of carried interests are not likely to solve that problem. Thus,
instead of resuscitating those proposals, policymakers should determine
the crux of their problems with carried interests and then identify (or, if
needed, design) reform that is both as responsive as possible to the core
of the problem and as consistent as possible with the rest of the tax
system. By parsing the law to identify the source of the fundamental
problem with carried interests, this Article facilitates policymakers’
abilities to fix what they really believe is broken.
Third, this Article redirects attention away from the narrow issue of
carried interests toward the broader, more fundamental aspects of the
tax system that are in need of reform. The underlying problem that
motivates the uproar about carried interests is not carried interests per
se. Rather, the objection is likely to a larger and more fundamental part
of the tax system, such as the capital gains preference or our tax system’s
10
overall degree of progressivity. Thus, this Article’s systematization of
the carried interest debate leverages the political salience of this debate
to help policymakers identify which parts of the broader tax law they
think are most in need of reform. Then, as our legislators embark on
11
comprehensive tax reform, they can try to focus their time and effort on
addressing these bigger, more important problems that plague the tax
system, rather than focusing on narrow issues such as carried interests.
A couple of caveats are warranted before proceeding. This Article
does not purport to highlight every possible objection to carried interests.

9. Of course, the political process can also seriously hinder the potential to reach an agreement
on reform. But even where well-intentioned policymakers focus on substance rather than posturing,
the failure to communicate effectively and the inability to understand the motivations of the other
parties to the negotiation can impede the ability of policymakers to compromise. Admittedly, people
sometimes agree on the same change for different reasons, and so it is possible that being more explicit
about the reasoning could lead to more quarrels rather than less. On balance, however, I think it is
preferable for people engaging in a discourse to have a clear understanding of their concerns and the
possible concerns of others involved in the discourse. Moreover, given that the industry-focused,
results-oriented political discourse regarding carried interests has not been fruitful even after six years
of proposed legislation, more insight into the issues could help break the stalemate.
10. Indeed, the core concern may not even be a tax issue; rather, the problem could be the fund
industry itself and the activities of the players in the industry.
11. Legislators are increasingly discussing the possibility of fundamental tax reform, but it is
uncertain whether these efforts will ultimately lead to comprehensive reform. See generally Lindsey
McPherson, Ways and Means Members to Meet and Plan Bipartisan Tax Reform Process, 140 Tax
Notes 422 (2013); Meg Shreve & Michael M. Gleeson, Few Senators Willing to Make Tax Reform
Suggestions Public, 140 Tax Notes 545 (2013); Press Release, Senator Max Baucus, U.S. Senate
Comm. on Finance, Baucus Statement on the Public Calling for Tax Reform (July 25, 2013),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/chairman/release/?id=893d0598-fd94-4493-b7b1ae4635ba6619.
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Rather, it focuses on the objections that are most likely to arise from the
major components of the analysis of the tax treatment of carried
interests. Surely there are additional objections that could be levied.
Moreover, the possible objections discussed below are not equally
persuasive. While this discussion focuses on the objections that are most
likely to generate hostility toward carried interests, some objections are
clearly stronger than others. Nevertheless, each is certainly a legitimate
basis on which someone could object to carried interests.
In addition, this Article does not advance an original proposal for
carried interest reform, provide comprehensive discussions of the various
reform proposals advanced in the literature, or endorse any particular
proposal other than to oppose the recent legislative proposals. Further,
this Article does not even argue that reform is necessarily needed.
Rather, it leaves each reader to decide for herself whether and what
reform is appropriate. But by methodically cataloging the potential
objections and responses thereto, this Article imposes structure on the
discourse, thereby improving each individual’s ability to identify the
source(s) of her concern about carried interests (and thus, about the tax
system in general) and providing her with a deeper appreciation of how
to create responsive and effective reform.
This Article begins by briefly explaining the current tax treatment of
carried interests and the recent legislative proposals for reform. Then, for
each major component of the analysis that contributes to the overall tax
treatment of carried interests, this Article articulates why that portion of
the analysis may be a source of an objection to carried interests. For each
objection, this Article discusses the design and the scope of responsive
reform. On the issue of the “scope” of reform, this Article pays particular
attention to questions such as whether the relevant reform ought to
apply to all compensatory partnership interests or only to carried
interests. Further, as part of the discussion of responsive reforms, this
Article explains why the recent legislative proposals regarding carried
interests are less than ideally responsive to the identified concern. This
Article concludes by recommending that policymakers think about more
than class warfare and vilification of the fund industry; rather,
policymakers should focus on implementing the reform that addresses
the heart of the carried interest problem and that addresses the broader,
more fundamental problems of the tax system.

I. Unpacking the Tax Treatment of Carried Interests
Compensation paid to managers of private equity funds, venture
capital funds, and hedge funds is generally comprised of two economic
entitlements. First, managers typically receive a management fee equal to
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a percentage (often two percent) of the assets managed by the fund.
Second, managers receive a right to share in the fund’s future profits (a
13
“carried interest”). While the specific terms of carried interests vary
from fund to fund, carried interests commonly entitle the manager to
14
twenty percent of the profits earned by the fund.
The value received by private equity and venture capital fund
managers on account of carried interests is taxed, often to a significant
15
extent, at the preferential long-term capital gains (“LTCG”) rate. This
bottom line tax result, however, is the product of several different tax
rules acting in tandem. In order to respond appropriately to the concerns
about carried interests, we must first understand the different rules that
contribute to the overall treatment of carried interests.
Thus, this Part provides a step-by-step analysis of the taxation of
carried interests under current law and briefly describes recent legislative
proposals for reform.
A. Tax Analysis of Carried Interests Under Current Law
Many businesses, including private equity funds, opt to compensate
service providers, in whole or in part, with ownership interests in the
business. Of course, the specific ownership interest depends on the type
of entity in which the business is operated. Private equity funds, venture
capital funds, and hedge funds are generally operated by entities that are
treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes. Thus, a fund
manager receives a partnership interest in exchange for services provided
to the fund.
1. Tax Treatment of Managers upon Grant of the Carried Interest
A partnership interest granted in exchange for services is classified,
for federal income tax purposes, either as a “profits interest,” which only
entitles the holder to an interest in future profits, or as a “capital interest,”
which also entitles the holder to a share in the underlying assets of the
16
partnership at the time the interest is granted. Capital interests are

12. See generally Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, Structuring Venture Capital, Private
Equity, and Entrepreneurial Transactions ¶ 1004 (2013).
13. See generally id. ¶ 1006.4.
14. See generally id. ¶ 1002.1.
15. Hedge fund managers, on the other hand, generally do not benefit from the preferential
LTCG rate because of the type of assets held by hedge funds.
16. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 § 2. The regulations proposed in 2005 regarding
compensatory partnership interests do not, on their face, distinguish between profits interests and
capital interests. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (proposed May 24, 2005) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). These regulations have stalled likely pending resolution of the carried
interest controversy.
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generally taxable to the service provider upon grant. In contrast, profits
interests are generally not taxable to the service provider upon grant as
18
long as certain requirements are met. In the fund industry, profits
interests are often referred to as “carried interests.” Thus, managers who
receive carried interests (just like other service providers who receive
profits interests) are generally not subject to tax upon receipt of the
interest. As a result, taxation of fund managers is generally deferred.
2. Tax Treatment of Managers During the Life of the Fund
Partners, including partners who receive their interests in exchange
for services, are taxed on their distributive shares of partnership
19
income. The timing of the partner’s inclusion of the income depends on
the partnership; a partner includes her share of that partnership income
in her taxable year that includes the end of the partnership’s taxable
20
year. And most taxpayers, including partnerships, are taxed on the gain
from an asset only when that gain it is realized and recognized—as
opposed to being taxable as the asset appreciates in value, like under a
21
mark-to-market approach to taxation. Thus, in the private equity and
venture capital fund contexts, in which fund assets are usually held for a
period of years before they are sold, the taxation of a holder of a carried
22
interest is generally deferred until the fund disposes of fund assets.
When partnership income is finally recognized, the character of the
income (i.e., capital gain or ordinary income) is generally determined at

17. McDougal v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 720, 727 (1974).
18. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 § 4 (providing that the grant of the interest will be
nontaxable if the service provider receives the interest “for the provision of services to or for the
benefit of the partnership in a partner capacity or in anticipation of being a partner,” as long as the
profits interest does not relate “to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from
partnership assets,” as long as the partner does not dispose of the interest within two years of receipt,
and as long as the partnership is not a “publicly traded partnership” within the meaning of Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, (“I.R.C.”) § 7704(b)). Further, if the profits interest is subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture, both the grant of the interest and the lapse of the forfeiture restrictions
will be non-taxable. Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191. The proposed regulations yield the same
result, albeit through a slightly different analytical mechanism. Specifically, the proposed regulations
provide a safe harbor that allows any compensatory partnership interest (whether profits or capital) to
be valued at its liquidation value. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. at 29675. This
approach to valuation results in the same tax treatment of these interests upon grant—a profits
interest (liquidation value of zero) is not taxed upon grant, and a capital interest (positive non-zero
liquidation value) is taxed upon grant.
19. I.R.C. §§ 70204 (2012).
20. Id. § 706(a).
21. Id. § 1001.
22. If a holder of a carried interest sells her interest, that could also trigger the recognition of
gain, even if the fund has not yet disposed of its assets. Id. § 741.
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23

the partnership level. This characterization determines the rate of tax
24
paid by the partner on the income. This partnership-level characterization
of partnership income generally applies to all partners, without regard to
whether the partner received her interest for a contribution of money,
other property, or services. Further, this tax treatment of service partners
applies both inside and outside the fund context. Thus, in the private
equity fund context, where income is typically characterized as LTCG, a
holder of a carried interest is taxed on her allocable share of partnership
income primarily at preferential LTCG rates. As a result, fund managers
often pay tax on income from a carried interest at a rate that is lower
than the rate of tax that they would otherwise pay on salary, which is
generally taxed at ordinary income rates.
3.

Bottom-Line Result

The tax analysis above indicates that fund managers typically pay
taxes on the income from their carried interests at a rate that is lower
than their marginal ordinary income tax rate. This rate reduction is often
the leading message about carried interests, at least in popular media and
25
political discourse.
B. Recent Reform Proposals
Many scholars, policymakers, and other commentators object to the
bottom-line consequence of the fund managers’ abilities to pay tax at a
rate that is lower than the rate of tax that they would otherwise pay on
26
salary. These commentators argue that value received by fund managers
on account of carried interests received for services should be taxed, at
least in part, at ordinary income rates (recently raised from 35% to 39.6%
27
for those in the highest marginal tax bracket), rather than entirely at the
preferential LTCG rate (recently raised from 15% to 20% for high-income

23. Id. § 702(b). One major exception to the entity-level characterization rule relates to
contributed property, where the character of income earned by the partnership may be determined
with respect to the contributing partner instead. Id. § 724.
24. Id. § 1.
25. See supra note 8; see, e.g., Peter Lattman, Romney Disclosure Reignites Debate Over Carried
Interest, N.Y. Times Dealbook Blog (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/
romney-disclosure-reignites-debate-over-carried-interest-tax; The Daily Show with Jon Stewart:
Indecision 2012: I Know What You Did Last Quarter, at 2:15–6:20 (Comedy Central television
broadcast Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-january-24-2012/indecision2012---i-know-what-you-did-last-quarter.
26. See supra notes 2−4, 8, 9.
27. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 § 101(b)(3)(A), I.R.C. § 1 (2013) (imposing a 39.6%
tax bracket above the 35% bracket).
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taxpayers ). For these reasons, the President, legislators, and others have
proposed reform.
Specifically, President Obama continues to advocate for taxing
carried interests at ordinary income rates. President Obama’s proposed
30
budgets repeatedly include the change, and he has continued to
31
advocate reform since his reelection to a second term.
Additionally, bills to add a new section 710 to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (the “I.R.C.” or the “Code”), which would
change the tax treatment of carried interests, have been introduced
32
33
multiple times in Congress, including in 2013. Some of the details of
the legislative proposals have changed over time, but very generally,
proposed section 710 would treat as ordinary income all or part of the
income from a service partner’s “investment services partnership
34
interest.” Importantly, the recharacterization provision only applies to
partners who provide certain types of services (e.g., investment,
management, and financing advice) with respect to “specified assets”
(e.g., securities, rental or investment real estate, partnership interests,
35
and derivatives). The recharacterization provision would not apply to a
partner’s “qualified capital interests,” which very generally are
partnership interests to the extent that the holder’s entitlement is derived

28. Id. § 102 (imposing a tax rate of twenty percent on certain long term capital gain income of
high income individuals).
29. See supra note 8.
30. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget of the U.S. Government 40
(2012) (“This [carried interest] tax loophole is inappropriate and allows these financial managers to
pay a lower tax rate on their income than other workers. The President proposes to eliminate the
loophole for managers in investment services partnerships and to tax carried interest at ordinary
income rates.”); Fiscal Year 2014 Budget, supra note 2, at 18.
31. See the White House, supra note 2; Obama Questions “Carried Interest” Tax Break, CNBC
(Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100429960/Obama_Questions_039Carried_Interest; Fiscal
Year 2014 Budget, supra note 2, at 18.
32. See Carried Interest Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 4016, 112th Cong. §§ 2−3; Rebuild America
Act, H.R. 5727, 112th Cong. §§ 341−42 (2012); American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R. 12, 112th Cong.
§§ 411−12; Job Creation and Tax Cuts Act of 2010, S. 3793, 111th Cong. § 401; Tax Extenders Act of
2009, H.R. 4213, 111th Cong. § 601; H.R. 1935, 111th Cong. §§ 1−2 (2009); Alternative Minimum Tax
Relief Act of 2008, H.R. 6275, 110th Cong. § 201; H.R. 2834, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
33. Cut Unjustified Tax Loopholes Act, S. 268, 113th Cong. (2013). Senator Levin reintroduced
the carried interest legislation on February 11, 2013. See Senator Levin, supra note 1.
34. See supra note 33. Some of the details have evolved over time, but the core objective of the
various iterations of proposed section 710 has remained constant.
35. See generally Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 111th Cong., Technical Explanation of
the Revenue Provisions Contained in the “American Jobs and Closing Tax Loopholes Act of
2010,” for Consideration on the Floor of the House of Representatives 259−87 (providing an
explanation for the legislation). There are additional details, many of which are intended to prevent
taxpayers from planning around the core objective of the section. However, for purposes of the
discussion herein, the provisions described in the text are most relevant.
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from contributions of money or property. That is, proposed section 710
targets carried interests—situations where a manager provides
investment advisory-type services to a fund that invests in securities and
where the manager’s entitlement is not based on her contribution of
property to the fund.
Practitioners and academics alike have critiqued the specific
37
provisions of section 710. In addition, scholars have proposed a wide
array of alternative ways to reform the tax treatment of carried
38
interests. Although the technical tax proposals vary from proposal to
proposal, most recommended reforms generally result in the taxation of
part or all of the carried interests as ordinary income.

II. Designing Reforms That Are Responsive to the Real Policy
Objections to the Taxation of Carried Interests
After parsing the analytical steps that explain the tax treatment of
carried interests, we can identify the many different components of the
analysis that could be the primary source of the hostility to carried
interests. In turn, this allows a clearer identification of the reforms that
are likely to be responsive.
This Part addresses potential objections to carried interests relating to
the grant of the interest, the taxation of the interests during the operation
of the partnership, and the big picture implications of the rules.

36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Howard E. Abrams, A Close Look at the Carried Interest Legislation, 117 Tax Notes
961, 970 (2007); Jack S. Levin et al., Carried Interest Legislative Proposals and Enterprise Value Tax,
129 Tax Notes 565, 566−69 (2010); Michael L. Schler, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests as
Compensation Income, 119 Tax Notes 829, 832−52 (2008); Letter from Charles H. Egerton, Am. Bar
Ass’n Section of Taxation, to Senator Max S. Baucus, Senator Charles E. Grassley, Chairman &
Ranking Member of the Comm. on Finance, Representative Sander M. Levin, Representative Dave
Camp, Chairman & Ranking Member of the Comm. on Ways & Means, Comments on Carried
Interest Proposals in Senate Amendment 4386 to H.R. 4213 (Nov. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2010/110510comments.authchec
kdam.pdf.
38. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 52 (suggesting the “cost of capital method” and also
discussing the “forced valuation” approach, among others); Samuel D. Brunson, Taxing Investment
Fund Managers Using a Simplified Mark-to-Market Approach, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 79, 82−83
(2010) (suggesting a modified mark-to-market approach); Noël B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler,
The Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get Carried Away, 61 Tax L. Rev. 121, 128 (2008)
(suggesting a modified interest charge approach that allows the service partner a deduction for the
interest deemed paid); Borden, supra note 3, at 1286 (suggesting a “partnership disregard” approach);
Gergen, How to Tax Carried Interests, supra note 3 (suggesting that all income from profits interests
should be taxed as ordinary income); Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 715−16 (suggesting an approach
that focuses on holding periods); see also Paul Carman, Taxation of Carried Interests, 87 Taxes 111,
127−34 (2009) (providing an overview of various reform proposals).
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A. Objecting to the Tax Treatment of Managers upon Grant of the
Carried Interest
When a partnership grants a profits interest to a service partner, the
grant is generally not a taxable event. Because a carried interest is merely
a profits interest that is granted in the fund context, the grant of a carried
39
interest to a fund manager does not result in current taxation. Thus,
focusing on the time the carried interest is granted, the root of the
objection to carried interests could be the use of equity-based
compensation (a profits interest) to compensate a fund manager or could
be the non-taxation upon grant of that profits interest.
1.

Is the Problem with the Use of a Partnership Interest to
Compensate Managers?

Businesses often compensate service providers, at least in part, with
equity interests in the business. When the business is operated in a
corporation, the equity compensation typically takes the form of stock,
restricted stock, stock options, stock appreciation rights, or phantom
40
stock. When the business is operated in a partnership, the equity
41
compensation typically takes the form of a partnership interest.
Regardless of the specific form of equity-based compensation,
compensating a service provider with an ownership interest in the business
to which services are provided arguably reduces the agency problem
42
between owners and managers.
Equity compensation, however, does not provide a perfect
alignment between the incentives of employees and owners, and many
have criticized the use of equity compensation. For example, particularly
in the public company context, scholars have argued that stock
compensation can encourage managers to focus on short-term
43
performance rather than long-term value generation, and it can fail to
39. See supra Part II.A.1.
40. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Present Law and Background
Relating to Executive Compensation 32−36, 42 (discussing forms of equity incentive compensation).
41. An alternative is the use of partnership options. However, while the Treasury Department
recently promulgated final regulations articulating the tax treatment of noncompensatory partnership
options, the regulations regarding compensatory partnership options (like regulations regarding
compensatory partnership interests in general) remain in proposed form. T.D. 9612, 2013-13 I.R.B. 678
(promulgating the final regulations regarding non-compensatory partnership options); Partnership
Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (proposed May 24, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
The uncertainty with respect to the tax treatment of compensatory partnership options has impeded
their use.
42. See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control,
26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 35 (1976).
43. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1915, 1922 (2010).
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align incentives because managers can hedge away the risk inherent in
44
the equity compensation. In the carried interest context, scholars have
noted that equity compensation increases the alignment of owners’ and
managers’ interests. Depending on the design of the equity compensation,
however, equity compensation can encourage managers to take on more
risk than owners would want (e.g., where the terms of the carry make it
akin to a very far out-of-the-money option) or could even encourage
managers to take on less risk than owners would optimally want (e.g.,
45
where the carry is equivalent to an at-the-money or in-the-money option).
There are many additional (and more nuanced) critiques of the utility
46
and design of equity compensation, and this discussion is not intended to
provide a comprehensive summary. Instead, this discussion identifies that
one source of commentators’ objections to carried interests may be a
fundamental objection to the use of equity compensation. That is, perhaps
equity compensation, including carried interests, is not effective enough
at reducing agency problems. If this is the concern, the appropriate
response would deal with all equity compensation, or would at least try
to ferret out which forms of equity compensation are least effective for
aligning manager and owner incentives. Then, these types of equity
compensation arrangements could be prohibited, limited in amount, or
otherwise be regulated or disincentivized. But the legislative proposals to
reform the tax treatment of carried interests are much narrower; they do
not focus on all equity compensation, nor do they focus on all equity
compensation in partnerships. They do not even focus on all partnership
47
equity compensation granted in the form of profits interests.
Rather, the carried interest tax proposal focuses only on profits
interests within a particular industry. This focus might be justified if the
use of equity compensation to align manager and owner incentives is
particularly ineffective in the fund context, but this seems unlikely. In
fact, carried interests have been identified as a good example of how

44. See Eli Ofek & David Yermack, Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution
of Managerial Ownership, 55 J. Fin. 1367, 1367−68 (2000).
45. See Victor Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 77, 97−108 (2005)
(explaining the option analogy); Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons
from the American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1089−90 (2003).
46. See generally Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in
Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967 (2006) (providing a nuanced critique of the utility and design of equity
compensation).
47. Moreover, if the objection is to the tax treatment of equity compensation (as opposed to the
use of equity compensation), then an appropriate response would examine the taxation of all equity
compensation, not merely carried interests. See Postlewaite, supra note 3, at 823−24 (“The narrowness
of [the carried interest] inquiry precludes consideration of the overall proper tax treatment of human
capital in compensatory transfers of equity interests in an enterprise. This exclusive focus on highprofile, recent developments in a single industry foreclosed an examination of the entirety of the issue
of compensatory equity transfers across the continuum of business enterprise.”).
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equity compensation can reduce agency problems. Moreover, the
structure of fund manager compensation is a product of a contract, often
49
heavily negotiated, between managers and sophisticated investors.
Given their level of sophistication, fund investors should be able to
contract for the financial incentives that they want to create for managers.
Thus, fund investors should be relatively well-positioned to protect
themselves from agency problems. Indeed, the risk of misalignment of
manager/owner incentives is likely more problematic when the owners
are more dispersed and less sophisticated than typical fund investors.
That would suggest focusing reform efforts (through the tax system or
otherwise) on equity compensation other than carried interests.
Perhaps the concern about the use of equity-based compensation in
the form of carried interests is not about protecting fund investors, but
rather about protecting the public and the financial system. Some have
argued that excessive risks taken by funds contributed to the financial
50
crisis. If carried interests create incentives for managers to take risks
that impose externalities on the public, that could justify additional
government intervention. Such intervention could involve prohibiting the
use of carried interests, capping the portion of manager compensation
that can be paid in the form of carried interests, or otherwise regulating
the use of carried interests.
Alternatively, Congress could try to protect the public from excessive
fund manager risk taking—not through regulation of fund compensation
structure, but rather by disincentivizing the use of carried interests.
However, encouraging people to do something (e.g., to stop using carried
interests) is quite likely to be less effective than mandating a behavior
change. Nevertheless, the use of disincentives is a viable approach to
reduce the risk-encouraging impact of the use of carried interests.
Disincentives, of course, can be designed in a variety of ways, including
through unfavorable tax rules. However, the proposed reform to the tax

48. Gilson, supra note 45, at 1072; Robert C. Illig, The Promise of Hedge Fund Governance: How
Incentive Compensation Can Enhance Institutional Investor Monitoring, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 41, 78 (2008).
49. See Heather M. Field, The Return-Reducing Ripple Effects of the “Carried Interest” Tax
Proposals, 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 1, 9 n.19−20 (2012) (highlighting several aspects of a manager’s carry that
are often heavily negotiated).
50. Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007−2008: Hearing on Hedge Funds
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (statement of Andrew W.
Lo, Harris & Harris Group Professor, MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. & Chief Scientific Officer,
AlphaSimplex Group, LLC), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1301217;
Jennifer S. Taub, The Sophisticated Investor and the Global Financial Crisis, in Corporate
Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial Crisis 188,
191−93 (James P. Hawley et al. eds., 2011); Financial Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis
Inquiry Report 28 (2011); Int’l Org. of Sec. Comm’ns, Technical Comm., Hedge Fund Oversight:
Final Report 6 (2009); The Joint Forum, Review of the Differentiated Nature and Scope of
Financial Regulations: Key Issues and Recommendations 4 (2010).
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treatment of carried interests does not create an effective disincentive.
The reform is not likely to curtail fund manager risk taking in an effort to
limit the potential externalities for several reasons. First, hedge funds
(not private equity funds or venture capital funds) have been the primary
targets of those who argue that excess risk taking contributed to the
51
financial crisis. But the carried interest tax proposals are likely to have
little impact on the hedge fund industry because very little of the income
earned by hedge funds is typically characterized as long-term capital
52
gain. Second, if the carried interest tax proposals are enacted, private
equity and venture capital funds may decide to restructure their
53
compensatory arrangements with their managers as contingent fees. This
merely changes the form of the compensation arrangement to mitigate
the adverse tax consequences of the tax reform, but it does not reduce
(or does not significantly reduce) the incentive for risk taking. Third, the
carried interest tax proposal may actually increase the incentive for
managers to take risk rather than curtail it because of the way that tax
reform could affect the operation of common fund agreement terms such
54
as “clawbacks.”
Ultimately, instead of trying to rein in manager behavior by
modifying the compensatory relationships that create incentives for
manager risk taking, there is a much more direct—and likely more
effective—method for limiting the type of risk taking by funds that might
have contributed to the financial crisis. Specifically, Congress could
regulate funds and their investing activities directly. This possibility is
discussed further in Part III.C.4 below.
2.

Is the Problem with the Failure to Impose Tax upon the Grant of
Profits Interests to Service Partners?

If a partnership interest is used to compensate a service partner,
query how the grant of that interest should be taxed. Under current law,
certain partnership interests, specifically “profits interests,” are not
55
taxable to the recipient upon grant. Because a carried interest is merely
one type of profits interest, fund managers who receive carried interests

51. See supra note 50.
52. Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 733−34.
53. Field, supra note 49, at 30−31; see also Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity
Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 115, 149−59 (2008) (discussing other possible industry reactions that could blunt the
revenue impact of reform and result in very little change to the substantive economics of the
compensatory arrangements).
54. Field, supra note 49, at 20−25 (explaining the possible impact of tax reform on the risk-taking
incentives created by carried interests).
55. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
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in exchange for their management services generally do not have a
taxable event when the interest is received.
Yet profits interests are not worthless. While profits interests by
definition have a liquidation value of zero at the time of grant, profits
56
interests have some positive fair market value. This is, of course,
because a profits interest has option value that comes from the possibility
that the partnership might have future profits in which the profits
interest partner would share. Thus, the grant of a profits interest is a
compensatory transfer of property that has a positive fair market value.
Typically, when a taxpayer receives a compensatory transfer of
property, the federal income tax law taxes the recipient on the fair
57
market value of that property less any amount paid for the property.
Thus, the tax treatment of profits interests—non-taxable upon grant—is
an exception to the general treatment of compensatory transfers.
Perhaps this is the objection to the current tax treatment of carried
interests—that it is unfair and inappropriate for the compensatory
transfer of a profits interest to be nontaxable upon grant, particularly
when the profits interest is granted for past or current services (as
opposed to future services), while other unrestricted compensatory
property transfers are generally subject to immediate taxation. Indeed,
58
some commentators have advanced this critique.
Of course, there are many exceptions to the general rule imposing
tax on the fair market value of compensatory transfers of property. For
example, amounts directed into qualifying retirement savings vehicles
can be excluded from current taxation, and the value of qualifying
incentive stock options are excluded from the recipient’s current
59
income. These exclusions, however, are provided by Congress in the
Code, whereas the favorable tax treatment for profits interest was
neither enacted by Congress nor promulgated pursuant to notice and
60
comment rulemaking; the source of the authority is a mere revenue

56. See Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 Tax Law. 19,
21 (1992) (arguing that using liquidation value to value profits interest is unsound).
57. I.R.C. §§ 61, 83 (2012). Assume cash method taxpayers for simplicity.
58. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 4, at 248 (arguing for immediate taxation when a profits
interest is granted for completed or substantially completed services). See generally Lee A. Sheppard,
Massive Giveaway in Partnership Compensatory Options Regs, 107 Tax Notes 1487 (criticizing the
IRS’s willingness to allow taxpayers to use liquidation value to value profits interests, thereby avoiding
any tax at grant).
59. See generally Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Present Law and Analysis
Relating to the Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests and Related Issues, Part II
24−33 (discussing ways that taxpayers can defer the taxation of services income).
60. The proposed regulations regarding compensatory partnership interests would have allowed
the use of liquidation value for purposes of valuing the compensatory interest upon grant, but these
proposed regulations have stalled. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (proposed May
24, 2005) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
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61

procedure. This is not even a statement of the Internal Revenue
Service’s opinion about what the law is; it is merely a statement that the
Service will not pursue this issue. Perhaps this issue is important enough
that if profits interests ought to be nontaxable on grant, Congress ought
to be the source of the authority for this treatment and impose
appropriate limitations on such treatment, just as Congress has done with
62
incentive stock options. Moreover, other exclusions from income for
compensatory transfers also (arguably) accomplish socially valuable
policy objectives, such as encouraging people to save for retirement. In
contrast, critics argue that profits interests are not sufficiently valuable—
from a social policy perspective—to justify their favorable tax treatment.
In particular, carried interests could be conceived of as a subsidy to
encourage socially valuable “entrepreneurial risk taking,” but this subsidy
63
justification has been heavily criticized.
Then what is the policy justification for failing to impose tax upon
the grant of a profits interest? Insight into the rationale is provided by
the history of controversy about this topic, which was largely resolved in
64
1993 when the Service issued Revenue Procedure 93-27. Without
recounting the full history, key factors justifying the failure to impose tax
upon the grant of a profits interest are the speculative value of a profits
65
interest and the administrative difficulty of valuing a profits interest.
Indeed, even the proposed regulations regarding compensatory
partnership interests demonstrate that valuation is a key issue; the
61. Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (explaining that, under certain circumstances, “the Internal
Revenue Service will not treat the receipt of such an interest as a taxable event”).
62. The tax treatment of carried interests is somewhat similar to the tax treatment for incentive
stock options, and the favorable tax treatment for ISOs is provided by Congress by statute and is
subject to significant limitations. I.R.C. § 442.
63. Arguably, the social policy benefit of subsidizing carried interests would be the facilitation of
economic growth by preventing tax from standing in the way of efficient business collaborations
between service providers and capital providers. See Fleischer, supra note 3, at 48 (explaining the
argument that the tax treatment of profits interests can be understood as a subsidy for entrepreneurial
risk taking). See generally Thomas J. Brennan & Karl S. Okamoto, Measuring the Tax Subsidy in
Private Equity and Hedge Fund Compensation, 60 Hastings L.J. 27 (2008) (attempting to measure the
subsidy). The subsidy argument as a defense of the tax treatment profits interests has been heavily
criticized. Jones Statement, supra note 3, at 4 (criticizing the subsidy argument for favorable tax
treatment of carried interests); Gergen, Pooling or Exchange, supra note 4, at 539 (describing as
“preposterous” the argument that the favorable tax treatment of profits interest, particularly in the oil
and gas industry, is justified as a subsidy).
64. See generally William S. McKee et al., Federal Taxation of Partnerships and Partners
¶ 5.02 (4th ed. 2007) (tracing the history that led to Rev. Proc. 93-27).
65. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, supra note 3, at 60 (acknowledging option value but
explaining difficulty inherent in valuation). But see generally Ordower, supra note 56 (advancing a
pricing formula to value compensatory partnership interests, and arguing that if the interest really
cannot be valued, the interest should be taxed pursuant to the open transaction treatment). See
generally McKee et al., supra note 64, ¶ 5.02 (explaining centrality of valuation issue to Campbell and
other cases).
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proposed regulations generally allow taxpayers to use the liquidation
value of the interest as the value of the interest that is subject to tax,
66
thereby enabling profits interests to avoid taxation upon grant. In
addition to the valuation concern, a variety of additional arguments have
been employed to justify the non-taxation of profits interests upon grant.
Such arguments include concerns about the risk of double taxation of
future profits (i.e., if the value of the right to future profits is taxed upon
grant, will tax also be imposed when the future profits are actually
67
earned?), and concerns about the ability of the service partners to have
sufficient liquidity to pay the tax on the interest upon grant. Commentators
have also asserted other, more theoretical, arguments in support of
treating profits interests as nontaxable upon grant by arguing that a
68
profits interest represents human capital that is not typically taxed, and
by arguing that non-taxation of profits interests upon grant is consistent
with the fundamental idea that partnerships are intended to facilitate the
69
pooling of capital and labor.
So query whether these considerations remain persuasive reasons
not to tax profits interests upon grant given the twenty years that have
elapsed since the issuance of Revenue Procedure 93-27. The impact of
the more theoretical arguments is largely unchanged; there remain
reasons for considering reform of the way human capital is taxed, but this
inquiry arguably should be made with respect to the taxation of human
capital in general, and not merely with respect to the taxation of human
70
capital in the fund industry. And the liquidity concern, which was never
71
particularly persuasive, should be surmountable. As to the risk of
double taxation, there is a remedy for this potential problem: amortizing
72
the basis in the future profits as the future profits are earned.
Implementing this fix can be relatively complicated both because of the
calculations and the careful partnership agreement drafting requirement.
However, taxpayers and advisors are increasingly sophisticated, and

66. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (proposed May 24, 2005) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). Both the proposed regulations and Revenue Procedure 93-27 lead to the imposition
of no tax upon the grant of a profits interest, but the analytical approaches are quite different. The
revenue procedure subscribes, at least to some degree, to the idea that grant of profits interest is
nonrecognition event. In contrast, the proposed regulations take different view—that the grant of a
compensatory partnership interest is clearly a taxable event, but the value of a profits interest happens
to be zero.
67. The Taxation of Carried Interest: Statement Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 8 (2007)
(statement of Peter R. Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office).
68. See, e.g., Gergen, Pooling or Exchange, supra note 4, at 544−50 (explaining this issue). See
generally Postlewaite, supra note 3 (discussing the taxation of human capital).
69. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 259.
70. Postlewaite, supra note 3, at 88789.
71. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange, supra note 4, at 545.
72. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 27071.
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technological advances may ease the burden of implementation,
particularly with respect to the calculations.
This leaves the valuation issue. Profits interests today arguably have
the same speculative value that profits interests had twenty years ago. So
perhaps the valuation issue remains a meaningful impediment, in which
case reform should focus on other issues, including the tax treatment of
73
profits interests during the operation of the partnership. But perhaps
advances in financial sophistication over the past twenty years better
enable profits interests to be valued, in which case responsive reform
should impose taxation on fair market value of these interests upon
74
grant. And perhaps the valuation objections to taxing profits interests
upon grant were never particularly persuasive except in the limited
contexts where “there is no market for both the services and the capital
75
involved in the exchange.” Regardless, if the objection to carried
interests stems from the failure to tax the service partners upon their
receipt of the interest, the objection is equally relevant to profits interests
76
inside and outside of the fund industry.
Thus, any reform to impose taxation upon grant of the interest
should also apply both inside and outside of the fund industry unless the
justifications for non-taxation upon grant are significantly weaker in the
carried interest context than in the context of other profits interests or
unless the non-taxation of profits interests upon grant is particularly
unfair and inappropriate in the fund context. Indeed, the fund industry
has grown significantly in financial sophistication, number of firms, and
77
in total value. The growth of the industry availing itself of the favorable
tax treatment of profits interests does not, itself, mean that profits
interests are sufficiently easy to value such that they should be subjected
78
to current taxation. Perhaps critics could argue that the financial
expertise of funds makes the funds uniquely placed to overcome the

73. See infra Part III.B.
74. See Fleischer, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing “forced valuation” as a reform alternative).
75. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange, supra note 4, at 54044, 560.
76. Moreover, the concern about taxation of the fair market value of the interest upon grant is
equally applicable to capital interests as well as profits interests because capital interests, like profits
interests, have option value. Thus, the total fair market value of a carried interest exceeds its
liquidation value. See Ordower, supra note 56, at 1925 (explaining why liquidation value is unsound
in both the capital interest and profits interest context).
77. See Taxation of Carried Interest: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 14 (2007)
(statement of Eric Solomon, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, U.S. Treasury Department) (detailing
the significant growth of fund industry).
78. Academic work acknowledges that fund managers should not be vilified because of their
success; rather, there should be a solid policy justification if there is going to be a change to carried
interest taxation. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 38, at 122.
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79

valuation difficulty and that the sophistication of funds and their access
to advice make funds particularly well-suited to deal with the risk of
80
double taxation. Thus, while it may remain largely untenable to require
partnerships, in general, to value profits interests so that service partners
can be subjected to tax upon grant of the interests, perhaps the Service
should require profits interests to be valued when issued by partnerships
with sufficient sophistication and financial expertise.
Ultimately, if the key concern motivating the uproar about carried
interests stems from the non-taxation of the interests upon grant, then
the recent legislative proposals regarding carried interests are not
responsive to the core concern because the legislative proposals focus on
the taxation of the service partner during the life of the partnership
rather than upon the grant of the interest. Thus, if non-taxation upon
grant of the compensatory interest is a powerful objection and responsive
reform is viable, Congress and the Treasury Department should pursue
reform and tax the fair market value of profits interests upon grant. If the
objection is meaningful but responsive reform is difficult to implement,
or if the objection is not particularly powerful, policymakers should then
consider other potential objections to carried interests and try to respond
to those objections.
B. Objecting to the Tax Treatment of Carried Interest Holders
During the Life of the Fund
Subchapter K of the Code imposes a single tax regime in which
partnership income flows through and is taxed directly to the partners.
Specifically, when a tax partnership realizes and recognizes income, that
income is allocated among the partners, and each partner includes in her
income the portion of partnership income allocated to her. The character
of this income (and the rate at which the partner will pay tax on the
income) is generally determined at the partnership level. These rules,
regarding the taxation of partnership operations, apply both inside and
outside of the fund context. Thus, when a fund recognizes primarily
LTCG (as is commonly the case in private equity and venture capital
funds), the partners (including managers holding compensatory

79. See David J. Herzig, Carried Interest: Can They Effectively Be Taxed?, 4 Entrepreneurial
Bus. L.J. 21, 23, 48 (2009) (suggesting that the initial public offering of Blackstone and other similar
entities supports the conclusion that it is possible to value carried interests).
80. Additionally, perhaps critics could argue that there is greater risk that funds fail to comply
with the requirements of the revenue procedure. For example, given that fund managers are so willing
to accept carried interests in exchange for their services (and given that some fund managers are
waiving their management fees in exchange for larger carried interests), perhaps we ought to be
particularly suspicious that carried interests do not have liquidation values of zero. However, if this is
the issue, then the responsive reform is better enforcement of the existing law.
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partnership interests) generally pay tax on that income at the preferential
81
LTCG rate.
Given that funds are generally subject to the flow-through tax
82
regime of Subchapter K, a fund manager’s ability to pay tax at
preferential long-term capital gains rates on income derived from the
manager’s carried interest is a product primarily of (1) the way in which
each partner’s distributive share of partnership income is determined
(i.e., the ability to make special allocations), (2) the rate preference
applicable to LTCG, and (3) the entity-level characterization of
83
partnership income. Any of these rules could be the root of the problem
with carried interests, and again, the appropriate response differs
depending on which one (or more) of these rules is the source of the
objection.
1.

Is the Problem with the Determination of a Partner’s Distributive
Share of Partnership Income?

If partnership income is taxed directly to the partners, then it is
critical to determine each partner’s allocable share of the partnership
84
income and loss. So, perhaps the objection to carried interests relates to
the way in which a partner’s share of partnership income is determined.
Holders of carried interests and holders of any other profits interests
are allocated partnership income/loss that is disproportionate to their
85
financial contributions. A partnership interest held by a profits interest
partner builds up value because income that would otherwise be allocated
to the partners who contributed capital to the partnership is diverted and
allocated specially to the profits interest partner. That is, it is only through
special allocations that profits interests build value.

81. The mechanics of the tax treatment summarized in this paragraph are explained in greater
detail above. See supra Part II.A.2.
82. Another possible objection to the taxation of carried interests may stem from the fact that
funds are generally subject to taxation under Subchapter K. This issue is discussed further below. See
infra Part III.C.1.
83. Arguably, the realization principle could also be viewed as a source of the objection to carried
interests because, assuming that the interests are not taxed upon grant, the realization principle allows
fund managers to defer paying tax on the value of their interests until the partnership actually
recognizes income. Pure mark-to-market taxation could mitigate the deferral, but it would not change
the character of the income. Cf. Brunson, supra note 38, at 10507 (proposing an alternative that
would tax initial allocations of carry as ordinary income, and thereafter taxing the service partners
using a simplified mark-to-market approach).
84. Technically, partners are taxed on their “distributive” shares of partnership income. I.R.C.
§ 702(a) (2012). A partner’s distributive share is the portion of the partnership income that is allocated
to the partner. Colloquially, the term distributive share suggests distribution, so this discussion
generally refers to the partners’ allocable shares of partnership income in order to avoid confusion for
any lay-readers.
85. See Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 4, at 10608.
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The partnership tax rules provide a tremendous amount of flexibility
for partners to allocate income and loss in order to create the economic
86
and tax arrangements that suit the partners’ business needs. These
allocations need not be made in accordance with capital contributions or
capital accounts. Rather, allocations will be respected for tax purposes as
87
long as they have “substantial economic effect.” If an attempted
allocation lacks substantial economic effect, the tax items will be
reallocated among the partners in accordance with the “partners’ interest
88
in the partnership” (“PIP”).
Commentators have criticized the availability of special allocations
in Subchapter K for a variety of reasons, including by arguing that special
allocations allow inappropriate shifting of gains and losses among
partners and that they enable taxpayers to circumvent substantively
89
accurate taxation of the economic relationships they create. Perhaps it
is the objection to special allocations that underlies the concerns about
carried interests—that partners, including service partners, should not be
entitled to allocations of partnership income that are disproportionate to
90
the partners’ capital contributions or capital account balances. If this is
the concern, responsive reform would merely abolish special allocations
and require that all partnership tax items be allocated in accordance with
some measurement of PIP. Unless the problems with special allocations
are particularly troubling in the specific context of profits interests or in
the even narrower context of carried interests, the responsive reform
would be appropriately targeted at all special allocations.
Query whether the argument opposing special allocations is
particularly persuasive in the context of profits interests. Special
allocations to a holder of a profits interest may be used to disguise a
nonpartner compensation arrangement. Or special allocations to a holder

86. I.R.C. § 704(a).
87. Id. § 704(b).
88. Id. See generally Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion of Partners’ Interests in a
Partnership, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1077 (2011) (explaining the difficulties of determining PIP).
89. Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Special Allocations, 46 Tax L. Rev. 1, 34 (1990);
see Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 Va. Tax Rev. 465,
471 (2011) (arguing that the benefits of allocation rules do not justify their complexity). Substantial
literature criticizes particular aspects of section 704(b)’s limitations on special allocations, arguing for
modifications to the economic effect rules and the substantiality rules in order to more effectively limit
abuses. See., e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations, 64 Tax Law. 97, 100
(2010) (critiquing the substantiality rules as ineffective). However, it is not really the rigor of the
definitions of economic effect or substantiality that implicate the treatment of profits interests, and
thus are not likely to be the source of the objections to carried interests.
90. Several commentators have raised these concerns. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 89, at 2; David
Hasen, Partnership Special Allocations Revisited, 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 349, 370 (2012); Darryll K. Jones,
Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 1047, 1093 (2006); George
K. Yin, The Future Taxation of Private Business Firms, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 141, 220 (1999).
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of a profits interest may be used to disguise an arrangement in which the
service partner’s compensation entitlement is determined without regard
to the partnership’s income; this is particularly true if the partner’s
purported distributive share reflects special allocations of gross income
91
items rather than of net income. Section 707(a)(2) and section 707(c),
respectively, are intended to prevent partners from disguising such
arrangements as partnership allocations, but commentators have criticized
92
both as ineffective. And if special allocations were disallowed, at least
with respect to service partners, there would be no need to try to patrol for
these abuses in the compensatory context.
Are these potential abuses more prevalent in the context of carried
interests than other profits interests? In general, I do not see a strong
case that this is so; thus, reforms to limit or bar special allocations ought
to apply equally to carried interests and other profits interests. But
carried interests might raise a uniquely pressing risk of abusive use of
special allocations with respect to one feature of carried interests that is
common in the fund industry: management fee conversions. In a
management fee conversion, a fund manager will waive all or a part of its
entitlement to a management fee (typically a percentage of assets under
management) and in exchange, the fund manager will receive a larger
93
share of profits. As Professor Gregg Polsky has argued, management
fee conversion provisions may be particularly susceptible to arguments
that they are not appropriately treated as distributive shares for the
94
recipient of the additional carried interest. If there is a high risk of a
section 707(a)(2) or section 707(c) problem, with respect to management
fee conversions or more generally with compensatory partnership
interests, then those provisions should be more effectively enforced while
95
special allocations remain allowed more generally. In the absence of
effective enforcement of these anti-abuse provisions, special allocations
could be prohibited in the types of partnerships (e.g., private equity funds)
where management fee conversions are common, or all compensatory
special allocations could be barred.
That is, if the problem with carried interests is the opportunity to use
special allocations to disguise the true substance of management fees, then
the fund-industry-targeted scope of the carried interest tax proposals may
be appropriate. The responsive reform would directly address the

91. See generally Lewis R. Steinberg, Fun and Games with Guaranteed Payments, 57 Tax Law.
533 (2004) (discussing factors that increase the risk that an entitlement will be treated as a guaranteed
payment).
92. Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 4, at 7484.
93. See Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 Tax Notes 743, 749 (2009).
94. Id. at 76263.
95. Cf. Schmolka, supra note 4.
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allowability of special allocations. This approach would be both simpler
and more intellectually coherent than the current legislative proposal.
2.

Is the Problem with the Existence of the LTCG Rate Preference?

If income is allocated (through special allocations or based on PIP)
to a partner (whether a service partner or otherwise) on account of her
partnership interest, that income must be characterized in order to
determine the rate of tax applicable to that income. Under our current
rate structure for individual taxpayers, income that is characterized as
ordinary is taxed at rates up to 39.6%, and income that is characterized
as LTCG is subject to tax at preferential rates, generally 20% for high
96
income taxpayers. Income earned by private equity funds and venture
capital funds is primarily from the sale of stock, and gains from the sale
of stock held for more than one year generally benefit from the LTCG
rate preference. Thus, perhaps the objection to carried interests stems
from our rate structure that affords a rate preference to LTCG. Some
commentators believe that the existence of the capital gains preference is
97
the key issue in the carried interest debate.
There is a vast, long-standing literature debating the policy merits of
98
providing a rate preference for long-term capital gains. Arguments in
favor of a capital gains preference include concerns about lock-in,
99
bunching, inflation, incentives for risk taking, and incentives for savings.
Arguments against a capital gains preference include concerns about
accurate measurement of income, neutrality between different types of
investments, encouragement of tax sheltering activity, simplicity, and
100
distributional considerations.
There is no need to rehash the capital gains preference debate here,
but when thinking about the objections to the tax treatment of carried
interests, it is useful to consider whether the LTCG rate preference is the
root of the objection. If the objection to carried interests is to the
application of the rate preference to gains from the sale of stock, then
96. I.R.C. § 1 (2012). Higher rates apply to LTCG from collectibles and unrecaptured
section 1250 gain, and lower rates can apply to LTCG of taxpayers who are not high-income earners.
97. See, e.g., Philip F. Postlewaite, The Taxation of Compensatory Profits Interests: The Blind Men
and the Elephant, 29 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 763, 776 (2009) (“The true culprit which causes the heated
debate [about carried interests] . . . . is the presence of preferential treatment for a class of income,
long-term capital gains.”); Weisbach, supra note 8, at 763 (“The distributional problem with the
taxation of wealthy private equity sponsors, however, should not be solved by changing the technical
rules for the taxation of carried interests. The issue arises because of the capital gains preference more
generally.”).
98. See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 247
(1957); Calvin Johnson, Seventeen Culls from Capital Gains, 48 Tax Notes 1285 (1990).
99. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 105th Cong., Tax Treatment of Capital Gains and
Losses 3034 (summarizing the arguments for a rate preference).
100. See id. at 3436, 4546 (summarizing the arguments against a rate preference).
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responsive reform would focus on the rate preference itself. Similarly, if
the objection is to the ability of any fund investor, in general, to pay tax
on their fund income at LTCG rates, then responsive reform would again
focus on the rate preference itself. Because the current legislative
proposals regarding carried interests only focus on the ability of certain
individuals to benefit from the LTCG preference, these proposals are too
narrow to be responsive. Rather, responsive reform should restrict the
101
types of gains that can benefit from the rate preference and/or should
102
reduce the spread between LTCG rates and ordinary income rates.
3.

Is the Problem with Entity-Level Characterization of Partnership
Income?

If it is not the existence of the LTCG rate preference per se that is
troubling, the problem with carried interests may be that the eligibility of
income for the rate preference is determined at the partnership level
without reference to the identity of the partner to whom that income is
going to be allocated and without reference to the economic relationship
between the partnership and the partner to whom the income is
allocated. That is, perhaps the concern is about the ability of service
partners to avail themselves of the LTCG rate preference.
Partnership income is generally characterized with reference to the
103
way in which the partnership earns the income. Thus, if the partnership
earns ordinary income, then the partners to whom that income is allocated
will generally be taxed at ordinary rates. Because most income of private
equity funds and venture capital funds (though generally not hedge funds)
is characterized as LTCG, partners in these funds are generally taxed at
LTCG rates on their fund income. This is generally true regardless of
whether the partner received her interest in exchange for a contribution of
cash or property or in exchange for a contribution of services.
Many commentators criticize this result, arguing that income earned
by fund managers on account of their carried interests is, at least to a
101. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brunson, How to Tax Mitt Romney, 135 Tax Notes 1137, 1144 (2012)
(drawing on justifications for the LTCG preference to argue that the rate preference should not apply
to carried interest); Monte A. Jackel, Replacing the Ugly: Alternative Proposals to Carried Interest, 138
Tax Notes 1253, 1255 (2013) (suggesting, among other alternatives, the possibility of applying “a
special tax rate to some investment partnership capital gain”).
102. See, e.g., Solomon testimony, supra note 77, at 1516. Recent changes to the top ordinary
income rate and the LTCG rate for high income earners did, ever so slightly, reduce the spread
between ordinary income and LTCG rates for the highest income earners (previously 35% ordinary
income and 15% LTCG, now 39.6% ordinary income and 20% LTCG). American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012 § 101(b)(3)(A), I.R.C. § 1 (2013). This reduction in the spread is, however, too small to
respond to the concerns discussed in the text.
103. Section 724 provides a major exception to this general rule for the characterization of income
earned by the partnership from unrealized receivables, inventory items, and capital loss property
contributed to the partnership.
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significant degree, labor income that should be taxed at ordinary income
rates and that it is unfair for fund managers to benefit from a preferential
rate on their labor income merely because the compensation is structured
as a carried interest. The discourse on this issue is wide-ranging. Some
commentators argue that income from profits interests should be
characterized entirely as ordinary income, perhaps on the grounds that
104
the income is entirely returns to labor. Some argue that if a profits
interest is not taxed upon grant, the interest is most appropriately taxed
using an open transaction approach, which effectively taxes all income
from the profits interest as income from labor taxable at ordinary income
105
rates. Even if some returns from profits interests constitute returns on
capital rather than returns on labor, taxing all of the income from profits
interests as ordinary income may achieve a “rough justice” given that
profits interests partners are not taxed upon the grant of the interest and
thus benefit from deferral; that is, imposing tax at ordinary income rates
on returns to capital compensates the government for the time value of
money lost when the profits interest partner was able to defer the taxing
event. Others explicitly acknowledge that income from a profits interest is
106
partly a return to labor and partly a return on capital, and they conclude
that the income should be taxed partly at ordinary income rates and should
107
be characterized partly at the partnership level. These commentators
suggest a variety of ways to bifurcate the income from a profits interest
into partly ordinary income and partly income characterized at the
108
partnership level. The details vary, but all of these positions essentially
argue for “partnership disaggregation” pursuant to which characterization
should depend, at least in part, on whether the partner acquired her

104. See, e.g., Press Release, Representative Sandy Levin, Levin and Democrats Introduce
Legislation to End Carried Interest Tax Advantage (June 22, 2007), http://levin.house.gov/pressrelease/levin-and-democrats-introduce-legislation-end-carried-interest-tax-advantage (quoting Rep.
Levin as saying, “[t]hese investment managers are being paid to provide a service to their limited
partners and fairness requires they be taxed at the rates applicable to service income just as any other
American worker” when he introduced legislation to tax carried interests entirely as ordinary income).
It is almost certainly wrong to assert that all income from profits interest is return to labor. As
discussed in the rest of the paragraph in the text, there may, however, be other good reasons to tax as
ordinary income all of the income derived from a carried interest.
105. See, e.g., Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 4, at 72; Ordower, supra note 56, at 37.
106. See, e.g., Christopher W. Livingston, Finding the Right Balance: A Critical Analysis of the
Major Proposals to Reform the Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 62 Tax Law. 241, 241
(2008) (grappling with the service/capital return dual nature of carried interests).
107. See, e.g., id.
108. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 38, at 105 (suggesting a modified mark-to-market approach that
would tax the initial allocation of the carry as ordinary income, and tax subsequent appreciation as
capital gain); Cunningham & Engler, supra note 38, at 142 (suggesting a modified interest charge
approach); Fleischer, supra note 3, at 5455 (suggesting the “cost of capital” method); Livingston,
supra note 106, at 242 (suggesting a “modified implied loan approach that allows for an interest
expense deduction”).

I - Field_17 (Do Not Delete)

432

1/29/2014 6:38 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:405

109

interest for capital or for services. As a result, where an interest is
acquired entirely or partly for services, the income generated from that
interest should be characterized, at least in part, as service income, on
which tax is paid at ordinary income rates. Commentators contend that
this approach reduces opportunities to use profits interests to convert
110
into LTCG income that ought to be taxed as ordinary income.
Still others defend the current rules that characterize income at the
partnership level even if that approach results in taxing service partners
at LTCG rates on the income generated from their labor. Some of these
commentators argue that the line between ordinary income taxation of
labor income and capital gains taxation of investment income is hazy; for
example, goodwill of a business generated through the proprietor’s labor
111
generates capital gain when sold. Other defenders of partnership-level
characterization argue that it is most consistent with the premises
112
underlying partnership taxation.
If the defense of partnership-level characterization is not persuasive,
then the concern articulated above remains—that income from a
compensatory partnership interest is, at least in part, income generated
from services that should be characterized with reference to the way in
which the partner acquired the interest and should thus be taxed, at least
in part, at ordinary income rates, just as other income from services is
taxed. Unless this concern is particularly problematic in the context of
carried interests, responsive reform would adopt one of the many
proposed approaches to characterize all or part of the income from all
113
compensatory partnership interests as ordinary income.
If reform adopts some type of partner-level characterization of
income allocated to service partners, query whether the reform should
114
apply only to profits interests and not to capital interests. Both profits
interests and capital interests are granted in exchange for services, but
perhaps they can be distinguished based on whether the compensatory
transfer is taxed when the interest is granted. Profits interests are
generally not taxed upon grant of the interest despite the fact that the
grant does constitute a compensatory transfer of value. In contrast, when

109. Borden, supra note 3, at 130215 (naming and critiquing the “partnership disaggregation”
approach, and arguing in favor of the “partnership disregard” approach instead); see infra note 124.
110. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 3, at 4447.
111. See Howard E. Abrams, Taxation of Carried Interests: The Reform That Did Not Happen,
40 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 197, 21523 (2009).
112. See Schler, supra note 37, at 833; Schmolka, supra note 4; Weisbach, supra note 8, at 76061.
113. This Article does not endorse any one proposal over another; rather it argues that, regardless
of the proposal adopted, the scope of the reform’s application should be carefully considered.
114. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 25256 (discussing the economic identity between capital and
profits interests); Ordower, supra note 56, at 3031 (arguing that profits interests issues are also
relevant for capital interests).
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a partner is granted a capital interest for services, that partner is taxed
115
upon grant at ordinary income rates. Arguably, this tax event concludes
the compensatory transfer. For tax purposes, the service partner is
116
deemed to make a contribution of property, and thereafter is treated in
the same way as all other partners who make contributions of property.
That is, she is entitled to have income allocated to her characterized at
the partnership level. This argument for distinguishing capital interests
from profits interests, however, is only persuasive if service partners
receiving capital interests are taxed on the fair market value (and not
merely the liquidation value) of the interest. If liquidation value is used
(as is proposed in the proposed regulations on compensatory partnership
117
interests), then the recipient of the compensatory interest is not fully
taxed on the value of the returns to labor—some option value inherent in
the interest upon grant remains untaxed regardless of whether the
compensatory interest is a profits interest or capital interest. This
suggests that if a service partner is granted a compensatory partnership
interest—whether capital or profits—and is taxed only on that interest’s
liquidation value at the time of grant, then at least some portion of the
income later allocated to the service partner on account of the interest
would substantively reflect returns to labor rather than returns to capital.
Even accepting that partner-level characterization of partnership
income ought to apply only to profits interests, why apply such a reform
only to profits interests issued in the fund industry? Is partnership-level
rather than partner-level characterization of income allocated to profits
interest partners more problematic for profits interest partners in funds
than for other profits interests partners? Perhaps so because with profits
interests in funds, partnership-level characterization enables more
118
favorable tax treatment (capital gains characterization) than partnerlevel characterization would allow (at least partly ordinary income
treatment). In contrast, income allocated to service partners in many other
partnerships would be characterized as ordinary whether the income is
characterized at the partnership level or at the partner level. Yet, surely
some partnerships outside of the fund context earn some income that
would be characterized as LTCG if characterized at the partnership level.
Thus, if the concern is that partnership-level characterization of income

115. McDougal v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 720, 72427 (1974).
116. Id. at 726.
117. Partnership Equity for Services, 70 Fed. Reg. 29675 (proposed May 24, 2005) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
118. The more favorable treatment of partnership level characterization applies even to hedge
funds because partnership-level characterization of hedge fund income results in a significant amount
of short-term capital gain, which may be more favorable than ordinary income because short-term
capital gain can be used to an unlimited extent to offset long-term capital loss.
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could allow more favorable tax treatment than partner-level
characterization of income allocated to service partners, responsive
reform would apply not only to carried interests, but also to other profits
interests in partnerships that earn at least some threshold amount of
119
capital gain income. This again suggests that the scope of legislative
proposals to reform the tax treatment of carried interests is too narrow.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, perhaps reforms that focus on the
level at which income is characterized (i.e., partner-level or partnershiplevel) ought to be limited to carried interests on the grounds that fund
managers are more likely than other profits interest partners to be
sophisticated enough to bear the additional complexity of the reform.
But if this is the reason for focusing the reform only on profits interests
in the fund industry, then we should explicitly acknowledge that, for
simplicity reasons, we are deviating from reform that would be more
responsive to the real problem.
C. Objecting to the Bottom-Line Result
Perhaps the source of the real problem with carried interests is not
any particular tax rule and the way in which it applies to funds. Rather,
the true concern might be about application of the partnership tax
regime to funds in the first instance. Alternatively, the core source of the
hostility toward carried interests could be about aggregate revenue, the
overall degree of progressivity of the income tax system, or the fund
industry itself.
1.

Is the Problem with the Application of the Partnership Tax Rules
to Funds?

As evidenced by the above discussion, the taxation of a compensatory
transfer to a fund manager depends, to a large extent, on the tax regime to
which the fund is subject. A significant part of the long-running debate
about the taxation of businesses focuses on the appropriate method for
determining which businesses are subject to which taxing regime, assuming
120
that there are multiple tax regimes that apply to businesses. Historically,
119. See, e.g., Cunningham & Engler, supra note 38, at 139 (suggesting that the reform of the
taxation of profits interests should exempt any partnership engaged in an active trade or business, i.e.,
exempting partnerships who earn a significant amount of ordinary income).
120. See, e.g., George K. Yin & David J. Shakow, American Law Institute Reporters’ Study,
Reforming and Simplifying the Income Taxation of Private Business Enterprises (2000)
(suggesting a different tax regime for private and public businesses); S. Finance Comm., Types of
Income and Business Entities 10–11 (2013) (discussing different ways to classify businesses). Debate
also discusses the possibility of reducing the number of different tax regimes that can apply to
businesses. See, e.g., id. at 56, 810 (discussing integration options). The debate also discusses
whether businesses should be taxed using aggregate, entity, or hybrid theory, and discusses whether a
flow-through tax regime should more closely resemble Subchapter S or Subchapter K. See generally
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the tax law sought to distinguish businesses based on their substantive
121
features, asking whether an entity closely resembled a corporation.
Today, entity classification is largely explicitly elective; unincorporated
entities are generally taxed as disregarded entities (if the entity has one
member) or partnerships (if the entity has more than one member) in
122
each case unless the entity elects to be taxed as a corporation.
Funds are generally taxed as partnerships subject to Subchapter K of
123
the Code because they are typically organized as limited partnerships.
The partnership tax rules impose a single-tax regime in which income
earned by a partnership is taxed directly to the partners. As a result of the
application of partnership tax rules to funds, carried interests are subject
to a number of favorable tax rules, which were discussed individually
above. It may be that no one individual rule is the source of the objection
to carried interests; rather, there may be a more fundamental concern
driving the uproar about carried interests—that funds ought not to be
able to avail themselves of the partnership tax regime.
Commentators objecting to the taxation of funds as partnerships
generally fall into two categories. Some argue that the fund entity should
be disregarded on the grounds that partnership tax should only apply to
integrations of property and services; that is, where a business relationship
is primarily a “hired service” relationship (such as where fund investors
effectively hire fund managers to provide investment management
services), the business relationship ought to be excluded from the
124
definition of tax partnerships. Other commentators argue that funds, or
at least certain subsets thereof, should be taxed as “publicly traded
125
partnerships” which are taxed very similarly to corporations. They
argue that this approach would reduce “regulatory gamesmanship,”
curtail erosion of the corporate tax base, and provide at least a limited
126
response to the carried interest problem.

Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 Ga. L. Rev. 717 (2009)
(advancing the “aggregate plus theory of partnership taxation”); Philip F. Postlewaite et al., A Critique
of the ALI’s Federal Income Tax ProjectSubchapter K: Proposals on the Taxation of Partners,
75 Geo L.J. 423 (1986) (discussing which aspects of partnership taxation should reflect an aggregate
theory and which should reflect an entity theory); Rebecca S. Rudnick, Enforcing the Fundamental
Premises of Partnership Taxation, 22 Hofstra L. Rev. 229 (1993) (defending the core of the
partnership tax system and the conduit model for taxing business).
121. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960) (the “Kintner regulations”); See Morrissey v. Comm’r,
296 U.S. 344, 357–59 (1935).
122. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006).
123. A limited partnership can, however, elect to be taxed as a corporation. Id.
124. Borden, supra note 109, at 131521.
125. S. 1624, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing that funds whose interests are publicly traded ought to
be taxed as corporations); see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 Tax L. Rev. 89, 92−93 (2008).
126. See id. at 92.
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Indeed, the debate about carried interests may suggest that the
scope of tax “partnerships” ought to be refined. However, to the extent
that the source of the outrage created by carried interests is caused by
the application of the partnership tax regime to funds, we should think
more broadly about the appropriate scope of Subchapter K. For example,
given the reasons for excluding funds from Subchapter K, are there likely
to be other types of enterprises that also ought to be excluded from (or
included in) Subchapter K? Some existing literature, particularly articles
by Professor Bradley Borden, takes a more comprehensive approach to
127
defining the scope of Subchapter K.
2.

Is the Problem with Reduction in Aggregate Revenue?

Perhaps the objection to carried interests is less about the details of
the tax rules and more about the loss of revenue—that the tax rules
applicable to carried interests allow fund managers to pay particularly
low taxes at a time when the country has serious revenue needs. It is true
that profits interest partners are taxed favorably, but this is primarily a
shift of the tax burden from profits interest partners to other partners
128
rather than a reduction in the total tax burden. That is, from a joint tax
perspective, the aggregate revenue collected from the partners in the
relevant partnership should not be reduced as long as the non-service
partners are subject to the same marginal tax rates as the managers and
as long as the managers provide services that do not need to be
129
capitalized. To the extent, however, that fund investors are tax-exempt
130
(as many are) or that salary payments to the managers would be
capitalizable rather than currently deductible, the aggregate revenue
collected from fund owners under the existing tax rules would be less
127. Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 925, 982−84
(2006) (discussing extent to which federal tax partnership classification should depend on state law
classification); Bradley T. Borden, Policy and Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax Partnerships,
56 U. Kan. L. Rev. 317, 360 (2008) (arguing that investment partnerships should not be eligible for
Subchapter K because they can directly trace income to property and investors).
128. In some situations, using a profit interest rather than salary to compensate a service partner
may not even reduce the service partner’s tax burden, but the conditions that enable this result
(namely, allocations to the service partner of ordinary income where salary payments would be
currently deductible) generally do not exist in the fund context. See Gergen, Service Partners, supra
note 4, at 72.
129. Karen C. Burke, The Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform, 1 Colum. J. Tax L. 1, 3−7
(2010) (employing a joint-tax perspective); Knoll, supra note 53, at 127−28 (same); Chris William
Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It?
Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1071, 1103−06 (2008) (same).
130. Solomon, supra note 77, at 8−9; see Preqin, Preqin Special Report: Institutional Investor
Outlook for Hedge Funds in 2012 at 5 fig. 8 (2011) (reporting that more than half of hedge fund
investors are foundations, endowments or pension funds); Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 110th
Cong., Present Law and Analysis Relating to Tax Treatment of Partnership Carried Interests
37 (reporting the same as to venture capital funds).
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than the aggregate revenue that would be collected from fund owners if
managers were compensated with regular salary payments, taxable at
ordinary income rates.
If revenue reduction is the real concern motivating objections to
carried interests, revenue expectations from legislative proposals for
reforming the tax treatment of profits interests should take the joint tax
perspective into account. When considered from that perspective, the
legislative proposals for carried interests reform would not be
131
particularly responsive to a core concern about revenue. Moreover, if
aggregate revenue is the key concern, reform could be narrowly targeted
to those partnerships where there are most likely to be joint tax
minimization opportunities. The complexity of reform need not be
imposed on all service partners; rather, the reforms could apply only to
partnerships with partners who are not in the highest marginal tax
bracket—particularly where partners are tax-exempt—and to partnerships
in which service partners perform capitalizable services. Reform of this
scope would likely apply to some, but not all, carried interests, and would
likely apply to some, but not all, other profits interests as well. Or said
differently, if the real problem is revenue, reforms that target only
carried interests are likely both over and under-inclusive. As a result, in
order to ensure that the reform applies to all partnerships that can
minimize joint taxes using profits interest, the reform must apply even to
partnerships outside of the fund context. We ought not to limit reforms
to carried interests merely because “private equity is a deep and
132
politically expedient pocket” from which to collect additional revenue.
3.

Is the Problem with the Degree of Progressivity in the Tax Rate
Structure?

Perhaps the concern with the bottom-line tax treatment of carried
interests is less about the aggregate revenue collection and more about
the distribution of the total tax burden among members of society.
133
Commentary in political discourse and the popular press often reflects
the view that fund managers are quite wealthy and the very rich in our

131. Knoll, supra note 53, at 161 (“[W]hatever the other merits of taxing carried interests at
ordinary tax rates, it is very clear in the context of existing budget deficits and priorities that reforming
the tax treatment of carried interests will provide relatively little tax revenue for other purposes.”).
132. Abrams, supra note 111, at 227 (framing the revenue issue in these terms).
133. See supra note 8. This was particularly true of the political discourse from the 2012
presidential campaign during which Mitt Romney’s tax situation focused attention on the
distributional equity implications of the tax treatment of carried interests. See, e.g., Romney Supports,
supra note 7; Pat Garofalo, The Real Scandal in Private Equity? It’s the Taxes, The Atlantic (Jan. 17,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/the-real-scandal-in-private-equity-its-thetaxes/251463.
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society do not pay their “fair share” of taxes. But if this concern
motivates the objections to carried interest, then the carried interest
proposals are significantly under-inclusive; the proposals to change the
tax treatment of carried interests only affect fund managers rather than
all high-income individuals, and are likely to affect primarily private
equity and venture capital fund managers (and not hedge fund managers,
whose income is generally not characterized as LTCG). Moreover, an
increase in the nominal tax burden on fund managers does not
necessarily mean that the fund managers will actually bear the economic
burden of the additional tax burden; contractual and behavioral changes
can shift the incidence of the nominally increased tax burden to fund
135
investors (and possibly others).
Instead, to address concerns about the appropriate level of taxation
of high-income individuals, more responsive reform would increase the
degree of progressivity in the tax system through base broadening and/or
raise the ordinary income and/or LTCG rates applicable to high-income
individuals. This reform would be made applicable to all high income
individuals and not solely those who work in the fund industry.
Indeed, the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 recently
increased the progressivity of the tax system by raising both ordinary
income rates from 35% to 39.6% for the taxpayers in the highest
marginal tax bracket and LTCG rates from 15% to 20% for high income
136
taxpayers. Are these rate increases sufficient to create the right amount
of progressivity in our income tax system? Maybe, maybe not—but at
least these rate increases apply to all high-income taxpayers and not
merely high-income private equity and venture capital fund managers.
4.

Is the Problem with the Fund Industry Itself?

Alternatively, perhaps the concern implicated by carried interests is
not about high-income people in general, but rather fund managers in
particular. That is, the objection is not to the form of the compensatory
transfer but instead to the fund industry and the people involved in the
industry; fund managers fail to produce anything of social value, and they
adversely affect the economy.
If the uproar about carried interests is primarily a condemnation of
the fund industry, then changing the tax treatment of carried interests is
a relatively weak response. Among other reasons, this is because hedge

134. See Abrams, supra note 111, at 227 (noting the “class warfare” framing of the debate);
Fleischer, supra note 3, at 5.
135. Field, supra note 49, at 11−12 (explaining that fund managers, the intended targets of the
proposed reform, may not bear the economic burden of the reform because of the design of their
contractual agreements with fund investors).
136. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 § 101(b)(3)(A), I.R.C. § 1 (2013).
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funds are not likely to be impacted by the reform to any significant
degree, and because the reform fails to identify or limit the specific
problems created by the industry. Direct regulation would be more
137
effective because it would better enable policymakers to affect all
aspects of the fund industry, including hedge funds. Further, direct
regulation of the particular undesirable activities undertaken by some
parts of the industry would better enable policymakers to curtail more
precisely those industry behaviors and transactions that are most
problematic.

Conclusion
Many different issues could motivate the recent controversy about
carried interests. The appropriate response to the uproar (assuming a
response is warranted) depends on whether the crux of the problem is
equity compensation, some technical aspect of the partnership tax rules,
revenue needs, distributive justice considerations, disapproval of the
fund industry, or something else entirely. Any reform should reflect an
intellectually honest response to the fundamental concern.
Much of the popular and political discourse, and some of the
academic discourse, displays a class warfare orientation. If the concern
about carried interests is truly about progressivity and the allocation of
the tax burden among people of different income strata, then the narrow
proposed changes to the taxation of carried interests may be politically
expedient, but the proposals are not responsive to the core concern
about distributive justice, nor are the proposals particularly responsive to
the need for revenue. Perhaps the framing of the carried interest issue in
terms of class warfare and vilification of the fund industry is merely a
convenient way to draw attention to a technical but important partnership
tax issue or to a broader systemic problem inherent in the federal income
tax system. If so, that is not terribly troubling as long as the ultimate
reform proposals are broad enough to address the fundamental (even if
less sexy) concern. I am not optimistic about this because, to date, the
scope of legislative reform proposals has mirrored the narrow rhetoric
about carried interests. There is no evidence that the tone of the carried
interest discourse is likely to change, and there is only sparse evidence that
legislators have any intention to design broader reforms that would tailor a
solution to the real problem that motivates the hostility to carried interests.
Ultimately, policymakers struggling with the carried interest
problem should focus their reform efforts on the fundamental concern
that motivates their objection to carried interests. Once they have
identified their real problem with carried interests, they should fix that.
137. See Levin et al., supra note 37, at 578−79 (recommending regulation rather than tax changes).
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Admittedly, our political process may prevent the enactment of
broad reform that responds to the underlying problems in the tax system
that led to the carried interest uproar. Even in this case, however,
Congress should not enact the recent legislative proposals. Not only are
these proposals nonresponsive to the fundamental concerns that led to
the carried interest controversy, but the proposals are themselves
problematic. This is because they will make the tax law more complex,
will encourage funds and fund managers to restructure their
compensation to avoid the adverse tax consequences that would result
from the proposals (thereby further distorting incentives regarding the
compensatory structure for service partners), and will increase
transaction costs, all without addressing the underlying issues. It would
be better to do nothing.
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